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"The Wilderness on Brock Road, 2nd Corps, May 11, 1864." Sketched by Edwin Forbes.
(Library of Congress)
Field Fortifications, Part II - Introduction
If you missed "Field Fortifications on Central Virginia’s Battlefields – Part I” and wish to read it, you may do so here.
Following the Battle of Chancellorsville, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia both continued to use improvised field fortifications when practical. At Gettysburg, makeshift fortifications helped the Army of the Potomac defend high ground positions at times on each of the three days of the battle. Earthworks constructed at the Potomac River also assisted the Army of Northern Virginia in making its way back into the Old Dominion as Meade’s army pursued.
At Bristoe Station in October 1863, a railroad embankment served as both a screen and defensive position for the Federals to rough up Gen. Henry Heth’s division. And less than a month later, Meade’s men assaulted the Confederate earthworks at Rappahannock Station, taking the position and capturing hundreds of prisoners.
As 1863 began fading toward 1864, Meade sought another victory before going into winter quarters. He believed that an attempt to turn Lee’s left flank might bring positive results. After the Federals crossed the Rapidan River at Jacob’s Ford and Germanna Ford, fighting broke out on November 27 at Payne’s Farm and Robinson’s Tavern. That night, Lee decided to fall back to the west side of Mine Run and construct fortifications, hoping Meade would attack.
As Meade continued to seek out an opportunity at Mine Run, Lee continued to dig in.
Mine Run
Cropped view of "Rebel line on the left at the railroad cutting. Mine Run--opposite Warren's last position."
Sketched by Alfred Waud. (Library of Congress)
Many of the soldiers who mention Mine Run in their letters, diaries, and reports describe the intensely cold weather they faced in late November and early December. Already saturated with rain in the days leading up to the campaign, the ground froze hard, making digging—a challenge in the best of situations—even more difficult.
However, Maj. Walter Taylor, Lee’s assistant adjutant general, in writing to his fiancé noted, “we selected our position and proceeded to fortify it in the course of an incredibly short time (for our men work now like beavers); we were strongly entrenched and ready and anxious for an attack.” Taylor added that Lee himself “gave his attention to the whole line, directing important changes here and there, endeavoring to impress the officers with the importance of success in the impending engagement. . . . He was busy the whole time.”
Another Confederate staff officer, Capt. William J. Seymour, remembered, “The rapidity with which an army can construct a line of breastworks is truly amazing. When trees are near at hand, they are felled in an inconceivably short space of time, the limbs stripped off, and their trunks are placed lengthwise & on top of each other to the height of a man’s breast . . . the whole forming an impenetrable barrier to minie balls and fragments of shell.” Seymour noted that the Confederate works “were more elaborately and substantially made than any our army had previously constructed.” Worked into their entrenchments, probably for the first time, were headlogs. Seymour explained how to build them: “A top log is often placed on the works, each end resting on a block, thereby forming a crack of three or four inches through which the men can fire and keep their heads protected by the log.”
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Although this map sketched by Robert Knox Sneden contains some location errors, it clearly illustrates
the strength of the Confederate fortified position along Mine Run.
(Library of Congress)
Walter Taylor had hoped that Meade’s attack would come on November 29, but “it passed without one.” He thought “This looked rather queer to see two large armies face to face each busily constructing works for defense.” Lt. Col. William H. Stewart of the 61st Virginia remembered relishing as well the opportunity of fighting while protected. He remembered that although his brigade (Mahone’s) “had from time to time thrown up miles of earthworks, we, never during the whole war, had the opportunity of fighting behind or resisting an attack on them. . . .”
Along with the main line of earthworks, the Confederates also incorporated several other "force multipliers.” Col. Robert McAllister, 11th New Jersey Infantry, writing to his wife noted after peering at the works that “What we saw were only the outer works. Timber was felled in every direction in the rear. If we drove them from the first, we would still have to fight them in the last.” Also, the Confederates had placed abatis at some places in front of their lines, dammed parts of Mine Run to try to make it impassible, and dug rifle pits for skirmishers and sharpshooters in advance of their main lines. All of these supplemental defensive efforts would slow down an attack considerably and increase the defenders' chances of inflicting tremendous casualties.
The thought of charging such a position created as much dreaded anxiety in Meade’s army as Lee’s men hoped for it. Col. McAllister noted “that large numbers of pocketbooks and little keepsakes were handed over to the Chaplains to be sent to those dear ones at home. . . .” There is also ample evidence that soldiers wrote their names, companies, and regiments on slips of paper that they pinned inside their uniforms for identification purposes if they were killed.
"Battle of Mine Run, VA - Position of the armies of Lee and Meade, December 1, 1863."
Sketched by Edwin Forbes (Frank Leslie's Illustrated News)
However, on the morning of November 30, with all in readiness for Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren’s Second Corps to lead an attack on the previously exposed Confederate right flank, Warren surveyed the scene at daybreak. He reported, “I found the whole line had been re-enforced with all the troops and artillery that could be put in position; the breastworks, epaulements, and abatis perfected, and that a run of eight minutes was the least time our line could have to close the space between us, during which we would be exposed to every species of fire.” Deciding not to attack, Warren informed Meade, and “The operations of the day were thus suspended.”
Federal soldiers like Henry Matrau, 6th Wisconsin Infantry, were relieved. “To have charged those Heigts with the number of men we had would have been sheer murder & Gen. Meade knew it,” Matreau wrote to his mother. Pvt. Alonzo Bump, 77th New York, wrote his wife, “as Good Luck would have it the Ordar [to charge] was countermanded an the army Began to fall Back. . . .”
The Battle of the Wilderness
"Confederate entrenchments at edge of woods, [Saunders] Field, on Orange turnpike."
(Library of Congress)
After several months of winter quarters both belligerent armies prepared for the 1864 spring campaign season. As the Federals left their Culpeper County camps, and the Confederates moved from around Orange Court House to meet them, a clash awaited that would bring fighting again to the Wilderness. Like at Chancellorsville the year before, fortifications played a prominent role in the combat.
Creating protection was important from the beginning of the battle. Opening the fighting along the Orange Turnpike just west of the Lacy House (Ellwood) were regiments from the Fifth Corps brigade of Gen. Joseph Bartlett. Lt. Col. William B. White, 18th Massachusetts, reported that “On the morning of the 5th of May, after the regiment had prepared for a day’s march, a report came that the enemy was moving down the [Orange Turnpike], and immediately the division [Griffin’s] commenced to throw up a defense of logs and earth near where it had bivouacked.” White noted that companies from their regiment and the 83rd Pennsylvania advanced west along the road and threw out skirmishers, who “quickly ascertained that the enemy was present with strong infantry force, and that he was busily engaged throwing up breastworks. . . .”
"[Saunders] field, on Orange Turnpike, Federal entrenchments in foreground."
(Library of Congress)
Note the white fence around Wilderness Cemetery No. 1 on the right background. The Orange Turnpike is just off the right side of the photograph.
One of those Confederate regiments to the west was the 3rd North Carolina of Gen. George H. Steuart’s brigade. While writing his memoirs, a surgeon in the regiment, Thomas Fanning Wood, recalled about the Battle of the Wilderness: “Our men knowing their weakness, did what they had never done before, built breastworks in front of their lines.” While this statement may or may not have been correct for his regiment to that point, he continued: “It was surprising to see what tools were used. There were not more than two picks to a regiment, and not more than a spade or so, but they improvised tools by bursting a canteen with powder taking each half for a shovel, either with or without an improvised handle. A bayonet served to loosen the dirt, and the [canteen] shovels followed after.” To strengthen their fortifications the doctor noted, “Our men were good wood-cutters and were not slow to fell trees as the basis for the works.” As Wood noted, this proved to be good practice for the soldiers, as they would see plenty of this type of warfare through the conflict’s conclusion. Wood was amazed “to see how hastily they threw up trenches in a night and even in a few hours.” But, “On this occasion they soon had a good line of works and felt satisfied that they could not be driven out.”
Later in the day, once the Fifth Corps finally lurched forward, and as the fighting raged and then died out across Saunders Field and in the woods to its north and south, fires broke out. A soldier in the 146th New York (Ayers’ Brigade) remembered that, “Swept by the flames, the trees, bushes, and logs which the Confederates had thrown up as breastworks now took fire and dense clouds of smoke rolled across the clearing, choking the unfortunates who were exposed to it and greatly hindering the work of the rescuers [gathering the wounded].”
Remnants of Confederate earthworks on the west end of Saunders Field
(Photo: Tim Talbott)
Just to the southeast, on the Orange Plank Road front, Meade plucked Gen. George Washington Getty’s Sixth Corps division away from their corps in order to protect the Brock Road intersection. Once there, Getty ordered his men to throw up earthworks to hold the crossroads and to blunt the expected Confederate assault from Gen. A. P. Hill’s Confederates. Getty hoped Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock’s Second Corps would arrive soon. Gen. Lewis A. Grant, commanding the Vermont Brigade, noted that “As soon as this brigade took position, the regiments commenced throwing up rude defensive works, which subsequently proved of great value.”
However, before Hancock and the Second Corps had joined Getty, Meade sent orders for Getty to attack. In his report, Brig. Gen. Grant noted the difficulties they encountered as they moved forward: “The ground was covered with brush and small timber, so dense that it was impossible for an officer at any point of the line to see any other point several yards distant.” Fighting to a stalemate due to the fact that “the moment our men rose to advance the rapid and constant fire of musketry cut them down with such slaughter” made the Vermonters “maintain our then present position. The enemy could not advance on us for the same reason,” Grant wrote. Eventually, the Second Corps arrived and relieved the Vermonters, who “fell back to its former [fortified] position on the Brock road.”
Two Second Corps divisions soon helped bolster Getty’s flanks. In addition, Wadsworth’s Fifth Corps division came to assist in the area but broke and fled in the gathering darkness and confusion of the thick woods. All involved were thankful when the firing finally died off for the day.
"Throwing up breastworks in the Wilderness."
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War)
Both sides used the night hours to strengthen their works, however, some put in more effort than others. Pvt. Isaac Bradwell of the 31st Georgia remembered that “Ours consisted of logs and dirt dug up with bayonets and cast up with tin plates and our . . . hands.” Bradwell noted the enemy’s works “contained the dead bodies of their own men, besides army blankets, knapsacks, and anything they could find in the dark of the night."
During the night, Gen. Heth sought permission from his superior, A. P. Hill, to build earthworks in his front. Hill, however, thought it would only further tire out Heth's men. Hill also believed that Longstreet’s corps would arrive soon and relive Hill’s corps. Hill apparently did not take into consideration that it might be good to have the works at least started for Longstreet’s foot-weary men when they arrived and so he told Heath to let the men rest. When Longstreet’s corps did not arrive, Heth went to Hill two more times before Hill finally lost his temper, exclaiming “I don’t want them disturbed.” Hill’s decision produced dire repercussions the following day.
The morning of May 6 brought a massive assault along the Orange Plank Road by the Second Corps, with Getty’s and Wadsworth’s divisions also in tow. Hill’s reluctance to construct works during the night brought disaster as the Federals routed Heth’s and Cadmus Wilcox’s divisions. Longstreet finally arrived in the nick of time and counterattacked, stabilizing the Army of Northern Virginia’s dire situation.
A Confederate flank attack on the Federal left brought additional success but cost them Longstreet, who was wounded by his own men. The flank attack pushed Hancock’s men back to their works along Brock Road, some of which then caught fire during the fierce fighting. A late-day flank attack on the Sixth Corps on the Federal right by Gen. John Brown Gordon also proved successful but occurred too late in the day to be decisive.
The practice that the two armies received in building field fortifications at Mine Run and in the Wilderness would evolve to a whole new level as Grant determined to move south and maneuver Lee out into the open. The race was on to Spotsylvania.
"Capture of a part of the burning Union breastworks on the Brock Road
on the afternoon of May 6." (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War)
The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House
On the morning of May 8, 1864, as Gen. Richard H. Anderson’s First Corps Confederates arrived at Spotsylvania, they formed a line along a ridge on the Spindle Farm held briefly before by J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalrymen. Knowing their enemies would soon arrive, Anderson’s infantry and artillery started digging in. Just minutes behind, brigades from Warren’s Fifth Corps began attacking. As Capt. Amos M. Judson of the 83rd Pennsylvania recalled, “At that instant we dashed forward on a double quick, and not till we came close upon them did we discover that they were behind a breast work or logs and rails.” While some of Warren’s soldiers made it to and into the works, they were unable to take them, suffering heavy losses. Judson explained that the Confederates, “feeling secure in their numbers and in their sheltered position, they stood their ground and commenced pouring in a murderous fire upon our ranks.” The Federals withdrew a short distance and began building breastworks themselves. The opening act in what would become an almost two-week slugfest ushered in yet a new phase of field fortification construction, surpassing all those before.
As Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps arrived on the scene they moved to the left of Warren and attempted to turn Anderson’s right, but countering the Sixth Corps advance came Ewell’s men, who flowed into line to the right of Anderson. They, too, also started chopping and digging. Ewell’s line of earthworks, largely laid out and started the night of May 8-9, extended to the northeast, taking advantage of high ground. However, in doing so it also created a bulge or salient in the earthwork line that many believed made it vulnerable to attack. Soldiers thought the large salient resembled a horseshoe or muleshoe.
This military map drawn by Jedediah Hotchkiss shows the "Mule Shoe" salient protruding
from the Confederate line. (Library of Congress)
Gen. James A. Walker, who commanded the Stonewall Brigade, recalled: As soon as night put an end to the [May 8] combat, axes, picks, and shovels were sent for, and along the whole line . . . the men worked like beavers, and the crash of falling trees, the ring of axes, and the sound of the spade and shovel were heard.” Walker described the construction process: “Trees were felled and piled upon each other and a ditch dug behind them with the earth out of it thrown against the logs. The limbs and tops of the tree . . . were used to form abattis, by placing them in front of the breastworks with the sharpened points towards the enemy.” Work, where possible, continued the following day. Col. S. D. Thurston of the Third North Carolina (Steuart’s Brigade) remembered (perhaps exaggerating a bit) that on May 9 “the entire brigade, with no tool, except the bayonet and tin-plate, was spent in strengthening the lines. . . .” For added protection, some soldiers constructed traverses, perpendicular short works off the main line.
Tests of the “Mule Shoe” salient’s strength soon came. On the evening of May 10, Col. Emory Upton led an assault by twelve Sixth Corps regiments against the southwest base of the Mule Shoe. Impressed with the stout construction of the earthworks, the idea was proposed to attack in a column and land a sledgehammer blow. Upton’s men sped across the open ground and mounted the works. “The enemy sitting in their pits with pieces upright, loaded, and with bayonets fixed, ready to impale the first who should leap over, absolutely refused to yield the ground,” Upton reported. The first of his men who tried to scale the works were shot in the head. Other soldiers, seeing their friends’ fate, “held their pieces at arms length and fired downward” over the works. Yet others who scaled the works threw their bayonetted rifles at the defenders “pinning them to the ground.” Confederate counterattacks eventually limited the damage and pushed Upton’s force back out of the works, but not before his men captured about 1000 prisoners.
Cropped image from "Rebel prisoners captured in the charge of Gen. Wright's Corps - running in."
Sketched by Alfred Waud. (Library of Congress)
Despite its vulnerabilities, one reason Lee maintained the Mule Shoe—once calling it a “wretched line,”—was that his subordinates argued they could hold it with proper artillery support. However, misreading Grant’s intention to break contact on May 11, Lee ordered artillery out of the Mule Shoe in an effort to go on the offensive. The decision had significant repercussions the following day when Grant attempted another Upton-style strike, but this time with a corps and additional support.
May 12 brought hell on earth as Hancock’s Second Corps slammed into the tip of the Mule Shoe. Burnside’s Ninth Corps hit the east side of the salient and the Sixth Corps attacked to the right and among the Second Corps. The Fifth Corps remained at Laurel Hill holding Lee’s left in place. Brutal combat raged from before daybreak to long past nightfall. Fought in a downpour that produced a dismal landscape, the day remained etched in the minds of the soldiers long after the last musket fired.
Confederate fortifications and counterattacks again initially limited the damage. Pvt. David Holt of the 16th Mississippi remembered of the enemy: “Many of them were shot dead and sank down on the breastworks without pulling their feet out of the mud. Many others plunged forward when they were shot and fell headlong into the trench among us. Between changes we cleared the trench of dead and wounded and loaded all the guns we could get hold of for the next charge.” Thomas Galwey of the 8th Ohio noted that “Nothing can describe the confusion, the savage blood-curdling yells, the murderous faces, the awful curses, super-human hardihood, and the grisly horror of the melee! Of all the battles I took part in, Blood Angle at Spotsylvania exceeded all the rest in stubbornness, ferocity, and in carnage.”
The serene present-day surviving earthwork line of the Mule Shoe salient belies
the horrors that happened there on May 12, 1864.
(Photo: Tim Talbott)
Over the following week, Grant and Lee both continued tactical moves at Spotsylvania trying to gain an advantage. Most maneuvers included either attacking or defending field fortifications. Toward the end of the fighting at Spotsylvania, Lt. Col. Theodore Lyman, who served on Meade’s staff, noted that “The great feature of this campaign is the extraordinary use made of earthworks.” He was amazed at the speed at which Confederates could build field fortifications. Lyman jotted, “Hastily forming a line of battle, they collect rails from fences, stones, logs and all other materials, and pile them along the line; bayonets with a few picks and shovels, in the hands of the men who work for their lives, soon suffice to cover this frame with earth and sods; and within one hour there is a shelter against bullets, high enough to cover a man kneeling, and often extending for a mile or two.” Lyman added, “It is a rule that, when the Rebels halt, the first day gives them a good rifle-pit; the second, a regular infantry parapet with artillery in position; and a third a parapet with an abattis is front and entrenched batteries behind. Sometimes they put this three days’ work into the first twenty-four hours.” By this point in the campaign, he could have said the same thing about his own soldiers. Both had become experts.
As the armies moved on to North Anna, Cold Harbor, and eventually to Petersburg—where fortifications would evolve into yet another grand phase—their soldiers continued to use the ax and spade and whatever other digging tool they could improvise to protect themselves and hopefully end the war.
Sources and Suggested Reading
Earl J. Hess. Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864. University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
Earl J. Hess. Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign. University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
Jeffry D. Wert. The Heart of Hell: The Soldiers’ Struggle for Spotsylvania’s Bloody Angle. University of North Carolina Press, 2022.
Parting Shot
"Confederate entrenchments near junction of old and new Court House Roads."
(Library of Congress)
“The enemy’s defenses at this point were elaborately constructed of heavy timber, banked with earth to the height of about four feet; above this was placed what is known as a head log; raised just high enough to enable a musket to be inserted between it and the lower work. Pointed pine and pin-oak formed an abatis, in front of which was a deep ditch. Shelves ran along the inside ledges of these works (a series of square pits) and along their flank traverses which extended to the rear; upon these shelves large quantities of ‘buck and ball’ and ‘minie’ cartridges were piled ready for use, and the guns of the dead and wounded were still pointing through the apertures, just as the men had fallen from them.”
Excerpt from “Hand to Hand Fighting at Spotsylvania” by George Norton Galloway, 95th Pennsylvania Infantry (Sixth Corps), in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 4.
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Central Virginia Battlefields Trust's mission is to preserve, protect, and educate about Civil War hallowed ground at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Mine Run, The Wilderness, and Spotsylvania Court House.
